The following represents the formal submission of my Higher Degree Research (HDR) Professional Doctorate Project 1 Document.

This 47,000 word (excluding references, bibliography and appendices) document is in many ways equivalent to a traditional PhD Doctoral Program Confirmation Document.

The document has been spllit across 7 blog posts due to its size.

Please see Pt28a – Research Study Project 1 Submission, it includes the Title page, the Abstract, the Statement of Originality, the Contents, and the Introduction of the Exegesis.

Within this post, Pt28b – Research Study Project 1 Submission, it includes the Chapter 1 Literature Review.

Chapter 1 Literature Review

1.0 Introduction

Within this chapter I introduce, discuss and analyse contemporary literature and textural resources across the three (3) interdependent tenets of music-making, meaning-making and self-making. I commence with an over view of self-making and meaning-making. Discussion includes subjectivity and agency in contemporary life, segueing into creative practice; everyday music practice, musicking; and music and sound-making practice. Following, I illuminate a highly fragmented and yet complex field of contemporary creative practice as a result of converging musical style. Contemporary music-making practice now includes the broadened terms of both music and sound. Ongoing exponential technological change, social and cultural developments, and the changing structure of formal hierarchical industry structure have all assisted in fuelling a revolution in those engaging in music and sound-making practice.

1.1 Theories of self and subjectivity

1.1.1 The self as a social phenomenon

Along with the rapid and broad technological changes of the past four (4) – five (5) decades, society has also significantly changed. Mechanisms such as social structure used to inform people as to their identities – who they were, and how they should view their self. As social structures in certain societies have changed, the need has arisen for members to review who they are, how they see themselves, and what they want out of their life. “(I)ndividual self-fulfilment and achievement is the most powerful current in modern society. The choosing, deciding shaping human being who aspires to be the author of his or her own life, the creator of individual identity, is the central character of our time” (Beck in Taylor and Littleton 2012, 31). The pursuit of improving lifestyle and image are now a focus of the inhabitants of the DIY cultural domain: “Each person is engaged in shaping ‘who I am’, including through the construction of life narrative and the conscious presentation and manipulation of the external self. The later is presented through behaviours, bodily appearance and the many aspects of contemporary life which constitutes ‘lifestyle’ ” (Taylor and Littleton 2012, 31). As I came to discover, there was much written on the self, motive and identity across many different disciplines.

In terms of Psychology, I explored historical works in order to gain a global perspective of how discourse around self, motive and identity has evolved over the past century. I attempted to digest the works of Freud, Jung, Adler, Horney, Fromm, Sullivan, Erikson from a Psychodynamic perspective; the works of Rogers, Maslow and May from a Humanistic perspective; the works of Allport and Catrell from a Trait perspective; the works of Skinner from a Behaviourist Perspective; and the works of Kelly and Bandura from a Cognitive perspective (Ewen 2003).  I had varying degrees of familiarity with many of these perspectives from my undergraduate studies in business and management, my post-graduate studies in education and governance, and much through my own self-initiated readings.  It was however interesting, whilst revisiting these perspectives, to narrow my focus to self and identity, and how these develop over time and age. In terms of the developing history of psychology, I noted the early 20^th Century Freudian perspective on what anxiety is, and how it is created. According to Ewen, Freud saw the ego responding to external (from the outside world) and internal threats (within self) “with anxiety, a highly unpleasant emotion that is similar to intense nervousness. Anxiety does serve a self-preservative function, however: it readies the individual for appropriate action, so a limited amount is both normal and desirable” (Ewen 2003, 20).  I was keen to further investigate, and found myself returning to the works Rogers and Maslow and the Humanistic perspective. The Humanistic perspective made a notable change in the field of Psychology: they accepted that each individual had the answers to their own life. “(O)nly we can know, and choose our proper directions in life” (Ewan 2003, 198). Core to the Humanistic perspective, self and experience – subjectivity – is exclusively personal. As expressed by Rogers: “(e)ach of us exists at the centre of our private, ever-changing world of inner experience (experiential field, phenomenon field), one that can never be perfectly understood by anyone else… (Ewan 2003, 199).  In an attempt to explain the development of a child’s identity in terms of experiences gained, Long contributes: “(p)art of the growth towards maturity is an increasing identification of oneself in terms of ones own experiences. These experiences move from the early stages of being something that happened to the child …. to the adult stage in which experience is who that person is …. ” (1990, 47). Dewey differentiates experience in two ways: the verb to experience; and the noun, an experience. The definitions occur in different times: the verb to experience occurs now, in the moment of being. To experience is defined as occurring “continuously… the interaction of live creature and environing conditions is involved in the .. process of living” (Dewey 1934, 36). An experience has occurred some time in the past. An experience is defined as “when the material experienced runs its course to fulfilment”. An experience occurs when a “piece of work is finished in a way that is satisfactory; a problem receives its solution; ……. a situation, whether that of eating a meal, playing a game of chess, carrying on a conversation, writing a book, or taking part in a political campaign, is so rounded out that its close is a consummation …. Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency” (Dewey 1934, 36). Irrespective of the experience, humans need to understand everything they engage in and experience. Mezirow proclaims:“(a) defining condition of being human is our urgent need to understand” (2012, 73).  Irrespective of being in the moment of practice, or reflecting on a past experience, human beings need to understand the experience.  Experience is not limited to just a cognitive process. Experience draws on biological, psychological and cognitive faculties and capacities; and affect. Lawrence refers to these as rational and extra-rational process (2012, 472). The rational refers to cognitive faculties and process; and extra-rational refers to the biological, psychological and affect faculties and processes. “Extrarational describes a process of meaning-making expressed through symbol, image and emotional expression. These ways of knowing .. call upon our imagination … and our intuition (Lawrence 2012, 472). Engaging in practice – any form of practice – is an embodied experience.

Hargreaves et al introduce self from a social psychology perspective, citing William James in 1890 as one of the founders of the psychology, “was perhaps the first theorist to try and understand the self” (2002, 7). With much research since, there are still multiple views of self and identity, depending upon the particular perspective the researcher or theorist has. Whilst I have taken ownership of my natural inclination towards a humanistic perspective – perhaps not surprising given my world view of phenomenology – I was still keen to broaden my understanding of the knowledge that currently exists in terms of self and identity.  Writing from a developmental psychology perspective, Kegan presents in “The Evolving Self “ his idea of how the self develops over six (6) stages (1982, 73) in a life-long quest for meaning-making, and self-actualisation.  Referring to it as the constitutions of the self, Kegan compares his six (6) stage viewpoint to that of the works of Piaget, Kohlberg, Loevinger, Maslow, McClelland & Murray, and Erikson in a easily readable chart (1982, 86-87). With my knowledge of the works of Maslow and Erikson, I could see how Kegan’s six (6) stages were similar to Maslow’s five (5) hierarchy of needs (however with a split in the first order physiological need between Stage 0 survival and Stage 1 satisfaction). According to Kegan, in terms of self and identity there are similar viewpoints between the developmental theories of Kegan, Maslow and Erikson; all placing identity formation in a person’s Stage 4 development – early adult stage. Terminology does differ: Maslow refers to the same period as esteem and self-esteem orientation; whereas Erikson refers to the same stage as identity and identity diffusion (1982, 86-87). Hallam reminds us the “concept of identity is relatively new” (Hallam 2017, 475). Specifically discussing the development of self and identity in terms of music-making practice, Hargreaves et al make the point of how central the self and meaning-making is to the process. They commence summarizing the key concepts of self-system, self-concept, self-image, self-esteem, and self-identity. “(S)elf-system is made up of a number of self-concepts, or self-images, which are the ways in which we see ourselves. These self-concepts can be context – or situation –specific…………., or domain-related”; “Self-esteem is the evaluative component of the self, and has both cognitive and emotional aspects: how worthy we think, and feel we are”; “Self-identity is the overall view that we have of ourselves in which these different self-concepts are integrated“ (Hargreaves et al 2002, 7-8).

1.1.2 Self as social construct

Hargreaves et al make the point that self-image is a social construct, developed “by a process of monitoring our own behaviour, and making social comparisons. We constantly compare ourselves with others….” (Hargreaves et al 2002, 8). Newman and Newman supports this view: “This line of research supports the underlying principle from psychosocial theory of an ongoing interaction between the person and the social environment” (2012, 262-263). Hermans cites James’ 1890 research on the contextualised social self: “… the self is … not a self-contained entity, separated from the environment …., but a relationship, – often very intense – between a person and those parts of the environment which have personal value and affective significance” (2001a, 26). The self is embedded in a cultural and social environment, influenced by the narratives as they develop and are shared within that community. The evolving “historical process” informs a “developing self”, embodied in a “personal and collective history with direct affective implications” (Hermans 2001a, 26). Long’s study aligns to the view of James and Hermans. Long observed self-concept being closely related to social experience: in its infancy a child “has no concept of self-identity. It identifies itself totally in relation to the family and people or places that are important to the family” (1990, 47). Fivush and Buckner in their study of parent and child interactions found “the self is not simply ‘influenced’ by social factors, but .. the very core of self-understanding is constructed through, and reflects on, social interactions” (1979, 176). Barth confirms self-conceptualisation is a social construct, but encourages the need for studies across cultures in order to gain greater understanding of self. “Ethnographic literature from around the world reports great variation in how people conceptualise and describe human self, personhood, and the properties and structures of the individual” (Barth 1997, 75). Supporting a cross-cultural phenomenological research study approach, Barth offers: a “person’s subjective, experienced self” is evidenced by observing their everyday lives as they interact within their particular social community (1997, 78). Such cultural-based studies can then be compared and contrasted in order to glean differences in the way self-conceptualisation is developed. Barth found their study afforded “a diversity of templates for self-understanding and a rich vocabulary of idioms for self-presentation and self-representation” (1997, 90).

Hallam agrees with the relationship of self and environment. However, preferring to use the term self-system, acknowledging the presence of multiple self-images. “Historically, the term self-concept was used to refer to how individuals perceived and evaluated themselves in different areas of their lives. The self-system is made up of a number of self-images including those relating to self-esteem, self-efficacy, ideal selves, and possible selves, which are often context or situation specific and, which develop in interaction with our environment  (Hallam 2017, 475). In this view, there are potentially multiple self-concepts or self-images present within any experience. Building upon the previous section on experience I consider the following scenario. In the experiential situation of a music-maker playing in a socially arranged ensemble for the first time, there are likely to be a number of self-images present within the mind of the aspiring music-making practitioner. Assuming they have been playing the instrument of their choice for an adequate amount of time, they are likely to hold a positive self-image for their self-assured technical agency of the instrument. As previously tabled in Newman and Newman, this is likely to result in a positive alignment of their self-system. However, if this aspiring music-making practitioner is new to playing their instrument in a social ensemble situation, they may be questioning their ability to successfully partake in the experience without embarrassment. As a result of their self-image prior to the event, the practitioner may experience a range of negative faculty responses – from doubts or nervousness; or depending upon past social interactions, possibly even anxiousness, fear, or anxiety. In this situation, the misaligned self-system will impact their self-esteem. In the event the aspiring music-making practitioner has a positive experience during the ensemble experience, and receives support and approval from others, there is likely to be positive alignment in the self-system. The positive self-image will inform the self-esteem, and the practitioner will likely experience a range of positive faculty responses (Jarvis 2012, 181). However, in the scenario an aspiring music-making practitioner has had many positive life experiences up until this point in time, but in this particular situation does not have a positive experience during the ensemble experience (and does not receive positive support and approval from others), there could be either positive or negative alignment of the self-system. If they have a positive self-identity and can rationalise the experience as a first experience in which they took the opportunity to understand how they could improve for the next experiential opportunity, any negative faculty response may only be a transient – fleeting – response (Fredrickson & Cohn 2010, 777).

1.1.3 Developing subjectivity

Contemporary life is becoming increasingly more complex as a result of globalisation, the rapid speed of technological development, convergence of approaches to practice, and conflation of workflows. Specific knowledge and skills training as past generations engaged in are no longer the sole focus of development. Contemporary societal members need to also focus on developing a “contextually enacted way of being in the world” (van Lier 2008, 1). Exploring one’s subjectivity, and developing one’s “self-awareness” is paramount in this process (Lewis 2010, 313; Lewis et al 2010). “Experience includes everything that is available to your awareness at any given moment: thoughts; emotions; perceptions, including those that are temporarily ignored…. ; and needs, some of which may also be temporarily overlooked… However, only a small portion of experience is conscious” (Ewan 2003, 199). Ahern broadly defines agency as “the socioculturally mediated capacity to act” (Ahern in van Lier 2008, 1). More specifically, van Lier believes the following three (3) properties illuminate the inward and outward-facing nature of agency: “1) control over one’s behaviour; 2) producing actions that affect other entities as well as self; and 3) producing actions that are the object of evaluation” (2008, 1). Developing one’s affective expressions – that is, one’s extra-rational responses to experiences -, is dependent upon the growth and development of one’s biological, psychological, and cognitive faculties over time. Such growth and development is linked to one’s age; maturation; accumulated experiences and interpretative capacity; and the development of one’s self-system – the “concept of self “ (Lewis 2010, 313; Morin 2005, 116).

As highlighted in the previous section, it is accepted in contemporary perspective of self multiple self-images exist.Extending this, a number of researchers are of the opinion of multiple positions within the self. Newman and Newman’s (2012) “Development through life: a Psychosocial Approach” introduces self-theory and the view of multiple selves of the me and I as a developing phenomenon across a child’s life: “Self-theory is … the distinction between the me and the I, ….. changes from infancy through middle-childhood” (2012, 263). Self-theory considers the me as an objectified image of the self. ”The me is … the self one can describe – including physical characteristics, personality traits, social roles and relationships, thoughts and feelings”. It is how one may describe their self to another, perhaps as they would on a social media or network site. In contrast: “(t)he I is the self who is aware of one’s actions… . characterised by four fundamental features: (1) a sense of agency or initiation of behaviours; the self that experiences a sense of voluntary action or free will; (2) a sense of uniqueness; (3) a sense of continuity from moment to moment and from day to day; and (4) an awareness of one’s own awareness” (Damon & Hart 1998 in Newman & Newman 2012, 264). The I is how one sees their self in the moment of practice: one’s sense of agency in the moment of the action, irrespective of the action whether is swimming, driving a car, eating a meal, playing guitar in a performance, composing, or perhaps listening to music in a social situation. The I-position is the experiential perspective of one self in the moment of practice; or as Csikszentmihalyi refers to it – as when one is in the flow of practice (1996). I interpret the me and I position in self-theory to have differing perspectives relative to time. I understand these two (2) different perspectives of self hold two different types of knowledge about the self. The me holds knowledge from an external (outside observer, looking in) perspective; whilst the I holds knowledge from an internal (subject experiencing, in the moment) perspective. Therefore, in terms of time and practice, I conclude the me is based on a reflective perspective, after an event. That is, in the past. In contrast, the I is based on an in the moment of performance perspective, during an event. That is, in the present. In revisiting the earlier work in the field of psychology – particularly that of psychoanalysis, Freud’s development of the id, the ego and the superego had him referring to these as the three (3) masters (Ewen 2003, 17-26).  Whilst Freud may have referred them to as the Masters, it is my understanding these three (3) were aspects of the self, with differing roles and levels of self-knowledge and self-awareness. Over the next fifty (50) years, Erikson further developed the role of the ego within what became known as Ego Psychology.

“One of the constructive ego functions is to preserve sense of identity. This complicated inner state includes four different aspects:

1. 1. Individuality….;
   2. Wholeness and synthesis…;
   3. Sameness and continuity….;
   4. Social solidarity” (Ewan 2003, 171)

Erikson’s claims highlight how within the field of psychology, as a result of further investigation, there was on-going development of the multiple aspects of the self, and self-knowledge. Some thirty years later, under the banner of Cognitive Psychology, Neisser continued the legacy. In his article “Five kinds of self-knowledge”, Neisser’s study of self-specifying information established five (5) different aspects of self. “These aspects are so distinct that they are essentially different selves: they differ in their origins and development histories, in what we know about them, in the pathologies to which they are subject, and in the manner they contribute to human social experience” (Neisser 1988, 386). The five aspects that Neisser describes are:

• • the ecological self – “the self as perceived with respect to the physical environment”;
  • the interpersonal self – “which appears from earliest infancy just as the ecological self does, is specified by species specific signals of emotional rapport and communication”;
  • the extended self – “based primarily on our personal memories and anticipations”;
  • the private self – perhaps the first sense of self, “when children first notice that some of their experiences are not directly shared with other people”; and
  • the conceptual self – “or ‘self-concept’ draws its meaning from the network of assumptions and theories in which it is embedded” (1988, 386).

Lakoff observes it ”a common experience for people to have two or more inconsistent sets of values or needs that can not be satisfied at once” (1997, 97). These values may be (traditional) culturally-based, socially influenced, or subjectively developed based on ones’ experiences. In contemporary life, one is likely to find one self in multiple environments, social or cultural situations, professional or domestic interactions which may elicit or prompt different values, beliefs and attitudes to arise. In order to demonstrate how the Self may adapt and present itself in each of these experiences, Lakoff presents multiple metaphors of self that one may have. To list these: the split self metaphor; the true Self metaphor; the real me metaphor; the general inner Self metaphor; the unacceptable inner Self metaphor; the fragile inner Self metaphor; the true to yourself metaphor; the absent Subject metaphor; the scattered Self metaphor; the general projectable Subject metaphor; the internal causation metaphor; the Self-as-friend metaphor; the Self-sacrifice complex; and the Self-control is up metaphor (1997, 94-111). This detailed presentation illuminates the complexity of Self, and the range of (internalised) states of subjectivity one may go through across the course of a day, as one moves from one situation to another. Complex subjectivity appears to be a universality of complex human beings, irrespective of which social or cultural situation they are embedded. Lakoff concludes his Chapter with a cross-cultural comparison presenting a similar study of a Japanese person. Similarly the Japanese is also found to be a complex Self, with a similar range of Self metaphors occurring within the language and culture revealed (1997, 111-113). Brewer argues individuals are capable of adapting their identity to suit the particular social circumstance, thereby effectively having multiple social selves. There are many different social situations one can find themselves in contemporary life, requiring different presentations and conversations depending on the context[1]. Brewer proposes these collective identities provide the equivalent of a shield, buffering “the individual from the likelihood of threats to their self-worth if they were not amenable to such adaption (Brewer 1991, 481).  Jopling proposes rather than being distinct, separate multiple selves, the self is a configuration of many layers. Providing a historical account of the development of the self, he concludes with the view of self having the layers of: “a somatic and perceptual-motor layer, an interpersonal layer, a cognitive layer, a moral layer, and a cultural layer. Each … is specified by different kinds of information; each is acquired in different ways across different contexts and at different stages in the life cycle; each has its own developmental history; and each is subject to specific kinds of pathology and impairment” (Jopling 1997, 261).

An alternate perspective is that of multiple I positions. Three (3) leaders in the field of dialogical self are Mead, Bakhtin, and Vygotsky (Hermans & Gieser 2012, 1). They agree that a self’s inner speech plays a central role as an “organizer of human experience. From this point of view, private speech is seen as both the organizing and regulating tool of ongoing activity” (Goudena 2014, 204-205).  However, much debate exists about inner speech.  Wiley proposes there are two inner voices present –  inner voices of the self carrying out dialogue explicitly, or implicitly: “The two voices, internal and external, would be… aimed at two different audiences. The inner voice would be aimed exclusively and privately at the self. This voice controls the thinking process, organizes the stream of consciousness, and steers the dialogical self. The outer voice, in addition to being a variety of self-regulation, would be a rehearsal for communicating with others” (Wiley, 2016, 25). Rather than limiting to just two positions, Fogel et al summarise a dialogical adult as being: “composed of multiple I-positions”; “the I-positions occupy an embodied real or imaginary time and space”; the “self is inherently social because the real or imagined I-positions … discourse with each other” (2012, 191-192). It is within the discourse between the I-position and the audience – external or internalised voice – the speaker expresses meaning, gaining greater clarity of their expressed meaning as the conversation ensues. Dialogic narrative interactions are seen to be “more like improvisation” rather than rehearsed scripts (Fogel et al 2012, 192).  Their improvised form are most often either rigid – limited variation over repeated instances – ; or creative – with much variation between interaction instances. In their study, Fogel et al found“(r)igid frames limit the opportunities for growth” of self; whereas “(c)reative frames enhance self development”, through engaging in “an experience of becoming” (2012,193). Valsiner and Cabell in their chapter “Self-making through synthesis: extending dialogical self theory” propose the inextricable connection between dialogical voice and the development of a self-culture. “The individual uses mediating devices – within one’s own mind and within the immediate environment – to cultivate the life space. …. as various I-positions within the self engage in dialogue, they constantly cultivate themselves – reconstructing, renegotiating and reorganizing meanings of selves, in relationship to each other and the environment. As long as there is self-dialogue, there will remain self-making” (Valsiner & Cabell 2012, 82-83). Lindegger and Alberts support this view, adding each person needs to facilitate:  “the construction of an effective dialogue of these various voices or I-positions with each other and with the other people in each version of the story, as part of the construction and maintenance of the self……”. (2012, 219)  In addition, “(e)ach voice, or I-position, in the dialogue is located in a particular spatial and temporal plane, which is an essential context within which the I-position operates. Any voice articulating a version of a narrative is located in a particular space and time. ‘The self, then, is successively or even simultaneously located in different positions in an imaginal landscape and is able to move between these positions“ (Hermans and Kempen in Lindegger and Alberts 2012, 220).

1.1.4 Single and accumulated experiences of self

In every experience, people have within their self the interdependent elements of self-images, self-esteem and self-identity. Through experiences, people are afforded the opportunity to align their self-images (how one sees one self in a specific context), their self-esteem (how worthy ones thinks or feels they are engaging in that experience) and self-identity (confirm one’s overall view of one self). Newman and Newman propose three sources of influence on ones self-system:

“For every component of self – the physical, active, social, and psychological self – a person makes an evaluation of worthiness. This self-evaluation, or self-esteem, is based on three sources: (1) messages of love, support, and approval from others: (2) specific attributes and competencies; and (3) the way one regards these specific aspects of the self in comparison with others and in relation to one’s ideal self” (2012, 267-268).

In the event there is positive feedback, there is said to be positive alignment of one’s self-system. In experiencing positive alignment, one experiences positive rational and extra-rational faculty responses[2]. Csikszentmihalyi refers to the phenomenon one experiences in this scenario as, flow. Flow occurs “when people perceive opportunities for action as being evenly matched by their capabilities” (Csikszentmihalyi 2000, 50; 2014, 4383-4).  In the contrasting situation, where the self-image and one’s impression of the actual experience – are not well aligned (that is, negatively aligned), one experiences negative rational and extra-rational faculty responses. In the instance a practitioner has a determined self-image of the pending experience, and then finds themself extremely challenged in that experience not being able to engage in the activity as they had pre-imagined they would, the resultant rational and extra-rational faculty response is likely to be negative. “When expectations for control are high and a desired outcome fails to occur, psychological reactance is aroused, producing increased effort to achieve the desired outcome” (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones 2016, 29637). Such misalignment of self-image and self-esteem could be a result of an incorrect preparatory appraisal of the experience. Alternatively, the negative alignment could be the result of rational and extra-rational faculty responses during the experience, such as “nervousness, embarrassment, humiliation, and criticism (either feared or actual) associated” (Sloboda 2005, 186). It could also be the result of the unrealistic expectations of tasks required by a third party during that experience. Irrespective, negative emotional responses will result. Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones propose: “(h)ow individuals respond to an undesired outcome depends on both the importance of the outcome and the degree to which they expect control” (2016, 29637). Csikszentmihalyi is more specific: “(w)hen a person is bombarded with demands which he or she feels unable to meet, a state of anxiety ensues” (2000, 50).  Anxiety is well documented as impacting the human experience. Csikszentmihalyi highlights anxiety as being detrimental to one’s creative flow in practice  – of one being in the moment (2000, 49-54). Isen (2010, 548) investigated the effect of positive and negative affect on the decision-making process. Negative effect –not only restricted to anxiety – “in the form of anxiety or arousal (sometimes referred to as ‘emotion’), or ‘high drive’… narrows the focus of attention, impairs cue utilisation, and can impair performance as a result” (2010, 553). In contrast, the influence of even “mild positive feelings on thinking and decision-making has been found to be not only substantial but facilitative…, leading to improved decision-making and problem-solving” (Isen 2010, 549). Isen highlights a central aspect of discriminating options within a practice process, is that of risk assessment. People of positive affect were found to be more willing to risk. It has been found that “positive affect increases the negative utility of real, meaningful potential loss” (Isen 2010, 563). A person experiencing positive affect approaches the discrimination of options with less angst; than one who is experiencing negative affect. Someone experiencing positive affect is more likely to embrace a trial and error approach – such as the auditioning of materials in a music-making practice – with creative curiosity and playfulness; than someone experiencing negative affect. Even “mild positive affect tends to promote exploration and enjoyment of new ideas and possibilities, and new ways of looking at things…. Thus people in positive affect may be alert to possibilities and may solve problems both more efficiently and more thoroughly” (Isen 2010, 569). Öhman found similar evidence in her study of fear and anxiety (2010, 709). Whilst fear is often equated to having similar negative affect as anxiety, Öhman distinguished that unresolved fear develops into anxiety, with the subject having less effective means to cope in the situation (2010, 724). Isen shares this perspective, noting problem-solving and decision-making processes are typically negatively impacted by negative affect responses (Isen 2010, 553). In a third scenario, one could experience anticipatory nervousness prior to an experience, and then once in that experience, may realise a positive faculty response. In this instance, the anticipatory nervousness was just a transient – fleeting – anticipatory response.

Every day, most people have multiple experiences, each generating a range of rational and extra-rational faculty emotional responses – positive, negative, or both. These faculty responses accumulate within memory – short-term and long-term – and inform their self-system (Fredrickson & Cohn 2010, 783). Over the course of time, these accumulated multiple experiences guide people in the formation of their self-identity. “(P)ositive emotions produce upward spirals towards further experiences of positive emotions… building enduring personal resources” (Fredrickson & Cohn 2010, 783). People who experience positive responses will generally progress on a positive upward spiral in life – engaging new opportunities, learning, growing, developing, engaging in society, taking risks, enjoying life, and seeking out more opportunities to experience positive faculty responses (Isen 2010, 555). Isen refers to this positive attitudinal state as expectancy motivation (2010, 559). Over time “through experiences of positive emotions, people transform themselves becoming more creative, knowledgeable, resilient, socially integrated, and healthy individuals” (Fredrickson & Cohn 2010, 777).  Rogers was of the belief that “we are motivated by a single positive force: an innate tendency to develop our constructive healthy potentials. This actualising tendency includes both drive-reducing and drive-increasing behaviour. On the one hand we, we seek to reduce the drives of hunger, thirst, sex and oxygen deprivation. Yet we also demonstrate such tension-increasing behaviour as curiosity, creativity and the willingness to undergo painful learning experiences in order to become more effective and independent” (Ewan 2003, 198). Those who consciously, deliberately and systematically engage in positive experiences with a resultant positive alignment of one’s self-system,most likely progress on a path to self-realisation as per Rogers and Maslow’ theory (Isen 2010, 559).

In contrast, people who over time experience negative faculty responses and negative alignment of one’s self-system, will guide the person’s outlook. Negative alignment of one’s self-system across a few experiences is neither unusual nor, unwanted[3]. It is however problematic when one’s experiences are in the majority, negative. Ongoing misalignment of self-image and self-esteem over multiple experiences indicate that person likely has systemic issues. The issues could be cognitive, physiological or psychological. Not discounting neurological impairment, Koenig’s study of depressives found this state to be in part the result of unhealthy comparisons to others (1997, 70). In other circumstances, it may be the result of an unrealistic understanding of what it may be possible to achieve in the new experience. Referred as “positive illusions” or “self-serving bias”, Koenig notes three common tendencies with these people. They “tend to make unrealistically positive appraisals” of themselves; they tend to overestimate their “control over events; and they tend to be “unrealistically optimistic about the future” (Koenig 1997, 62). Whilst Koenig found that people demonstrating behavioural traits such as “positive illusions” or “self-serving bias” and likely sufferers of “mental health and depression” disorders, it is important to recognise such in the creative arts (Koenig 1997, 70)[4].Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones refer to this state as learned helplessness, noting “repeated, uncontrollable undesired outcomes, individuals show decreased motivation” (2016, 29637). Heron describes the treadmill-like cycle a distressed and compulsive ego likely takes as they bounce between the four (4) modes roles of: emotion, imagery, discrimination and action. Without the required level of self-awareness and self-reflective ability, the negative cycle will likely continue (Heron 2009, 133-134). As the negative affective experiences accumulate, the subject progresses deeper into a negative downward spiral in life, constantly finding further experiences of negative emotions. In such extreme cases the self can become demoralised. “(T)his type of demoralised self” share the symptoms of “guilt, self-depreciation, and suicidal thoughts – are directly linked to the cultural imperative to be distinct and unique”.  Koenig found an “increased predominance of these symptoms among Western depressives” (1997, 70).  Goncalves and Riberio explain the condition – known within the field of psychotherapy – as problematic self-narratives (2012, 302-305). They reveal through several empirical studies the existence of multiple I-positions within each person, likely espousing a particular – usually opposed – voice and narrative: a dominant – problematic – voice and self-narrative and an non-dominant – innovative – voice and self-narrative (Goncalves and Riberio 2012, 301). The research reveals it is not uncommon for people in these negative spirals to subjugate to their dominant voice and self-narrative, and maintain self-devaluating thoughts and dialogue. In such instances, the person may need external professional assistance to help break the negative spiral cycle as Heron describes above. In such a instance, the subject could be guided to become more aware of, and engage with the multiple –I positions; and hopefully learn to attenuate the dominant voice and self-narrative, and amplify the innovative non-dominant voice and self-narrative in particular instances (Goncalves and Riberio 2012, 302, 306-312).  The goal is for the subject to move through the final of the five developmental stages of reconceptualization and performing change; and if so, realise some upward progress towards what could be eventually, the alignment of their governing self-system.

1.1.5 Self-making and creative practice

Hartley refers to these inhabitants of the DIY cultural domain as DIY citizens:

“DIY citizenship harvests the same fields as DIY culture, but is not confined to spectacular subcultures or youth activism. It’s just as likely to occur among – for instance – suburban woman who have leisure to stay at home and browse the internet and who, it transpires are busy inventing senses of themselves..” (Hartley 2005, pp111-112).

Kuznetsov & Paulos and Prior refer to these inhabitants of the DIY cultural domain as the new amateurs. The new amateur seeks a wide range of interests with engaged commitment (Kuznetsov and Paulos 2010; Prior 2010). Interests are as wide and as varied as one can imagine. Of the more popular trends televised on commercial networks are: real estate-based activities such as renovation and landscaping; sport-based activities including team and solo rock-climbing, abseiling, mountain-biking, parachuting, to name but a few; leisure activities such as camping, trekking, travelling; and creative activities. Popular examples of creative activities include art and craft-based activities such as drawing, sculpture, pottery and glass blowing; fashion-based activities such as clothes and jewellery design and making; food-based activities such as cooking and cake decorating; IT games-based activities such as playing – solo, team and competing – and design; drama-based activities such as script-writing, acting, prop design and construction, and musical theatre; and music-based such as instrument-making, song-writing, production techniques and music-making. Having interviewed hundreds of people over a number of years regarding their creative activities, Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson found people engaged in such creative activities as listed above “because they enjoy what they are doing to the extent that experiencing the activity becomes its own reward” (1990, 7).  However, the activities I have referred to here are somewhat traditional types of creative activities.  Cultural consumption and production has continued to change significantly in the new millennium. Creative activities – creative practice – are no longer restricted to these types of activities (Taylor and Littleton 2012, 4). “An expanded and extreme set of creative practices is subverting well-understood categories of the arts and culture, collapsing the borders between traditional and the innovative, …… the everyday and the celebrity, the professional and the amateur” (Haseman 2005, 158).  In analysing a range of contemporary creative practice, Haseman found the following five (5) characteristics worthy of a millennia definition:

1. 1. Creative practices involve interactivity;
   2. Creative practices are intrinsically hybrid;
   3. Creative practices embrace new sites and forms of cultural production;
   4. Creative practices are orientated towards multi-platform, cross-promotional means of distribution; and
   5. Creative practices are not approached as if they are commercially irrelevant[5] (Haseman 2005, pp167-169)

McRobbie (1998, 103) believes millennia practitioners engage in creative activities for intrinsic motives as Csikszentmihalyi & Robinson found. However, McRobbie progresses the conversation, finding creative practitioners in her study using their “creative work as an expressive extension of self”. Sullivan suggests more contemporary creative practitioners consciously engage in art practice to make social and cultural comment about their environs. “Many artists these days do not confine their practice to a singular exploration of a signature style or particular focus on a recurrent theme”; instead preferring “to use their skill in methods and media to address broader questions of human and cultural concern” (Sullivan 2010, 97). The practitioner is engaging in practice as an embodied self within a cultural context.Taylor & Littleton narrow their view to subjectivity: “creative work is a means of self-actualisation” – a medium for the creative practitioners to discover themselves, on the path to realising their full potential (McRobbie in Taylor & Littleton 2012, 31).  In terms of the range of creative practice, music-making is acknowledged in research as being significant in terms of the development of self. Hargreaves et al (2002) discuss how music facilitates self-expression and development, allowing the self to transform, and construct new identities. Frith (1996,124) argues that “(m)usic constructs our sense of identity through the direct experiences it offers of the body, time and sociability, experiences which enable us to place ourselves in imaginative cultural narratives.” Bennett (2000, ii) concludes that “music is produced and consumed by young people in ways that both inform their sense of self and also serve to construct the social world in which their identities operate”.

1.2 Self and musical agency in everyday life

Music now plays a greater part in the every day lives of more people than anytime in the past (Hargreaves et al 2002,1).

“Never before in the history of humanity has music been such a pervasive force within our culture. Because of the explosion of electronic sound reproduction (devices), music has become a prominent feature of our daily life. We constantly listen to music within a variety of settings that are both functional and recreational” (Pen 1992, 3).

Consider our daily life. Begin with waking up; going to the bathroom; going for exercise; having breakfast; getting dressed; getting into the car and/or public transport, and commuting to work. By the time the average western person arrives at work, have they consumed music in any form? I have to think back at least several decades to recall daily life without music. Music existed, but it was generally reserved for social gatherings, parties and events. In that era, I recall music was generally not played in the house, in the car, in the shopping centre, or at friend’s houses as it is occurs today. The devices to play music may have existed, but the cultural norm – generally – was not to have music playing constantly. As technology developed, and as attitudes towards lifestyle changed, our daily music consumption patterns – listening – have also changed. Today, “(i)n the modern western world, a day without music is virtually unknown”. Reports of studies in the early 2000’s found that 28% of university students listened to music actively “for over five hours per day” (Williamon and Thompson (2004, 11). It must be noted, that this daily listening figure excludes what is referred to as “‘(p)assive’ music consumption, such as exposure to music while shopping”, in elevators, or in restaurants, or on hold whilst telephoning one’s utility company (Williamon and Thompson 2004, 11; Pen 1992, 3). Passive music consumption[6] and knowledge of how businesses use this and other forms of music to attempt to manipulate consumer behaviour to benefit their business is not new (Williamon and Thompson 2004, 11). It is however a form of listening that I need to acknowledge in a discussion regarding music in daily life. Music that is deliberately used to attempt to manipulate consumer behaviour varies in form. It may be as adverting jingles played on various media; it may be a form that uses popular songs – or versions of popular songs – in advertising campaigns; or in-store piped music playing to the shoppers as they peruse the aisles, listening passively[7] (Levitin 2006, 9; Frith 2002, 43). Owen in his article “The Soundtrack of Your Life”, likens the deliberately crafted Muzak (“elevator music”) to “retail theatre” (2006, 66) indicating its presence and significance in the modern world.

Over many decades, there has been resistance to such forms of passive listening. However, this resistance has not necessarily been for the reasons of having their personal behaviour manipulated. It appears most resistance has been due to the intensely personal nature of music to the individual:

“during Muzak’s early decades, office workers …. sometimes complained that public background music was an invasion of privacy” (Owen 2006, 71).

Frith (2002) notes a more recent case of such resistance, citing a music-loving Westminster Conservative MP who attempted to introduce a Bill in 2000 to prohibit “the broadcasting of recorded music in certain public places” (p36). The MP justified his attempt to ban passive listening in certain environments, arguing that music is intensely personal, and did not want anyone to be forced to listen to such piped forms of music – “acoustic wallpaper” – in environments where they had no choice to be there (p36). In modern society there is a mass and volume (pun intended) of piped forms of music we hear on a daily basis in our lives. Given some form of “emotional experience is probably the main reason behind most people’s engagement with music” (Juslin and Sloboda 2001, 3), it should not be surprising that general populace are protective of what they listen to, when they listen to it, where they listen to it, and with whom they listen to it. Aligned to this viewpoint, Hesmondhalgh proposes people in this era experience music on two dimensions: 1) “music often feels intensely and emotionally linked to the private self” (2013, 1); and “often the basis of collective, public experiences” (2013, 2).  Music is now more broadly considered, and something significant, which people want to experience personally and socially.

1.2.1 Consuming music (listening)

Hargreaves et al reason that our listening habits have developed progressively due to “the extremely rapid technological developments that have occurred in the last two decades”; and the “increasing commercialization and economic power of the music industry” (2002, 1).  Frith agrees in part, proposing that our listening habits have developed progressively over decades primarily due to two phenomena: firstly, our increased access to technology due to development of listening devices – from as early as the radio, through to the record player, the tape machine, and beyond; and secondly due to the proliferation of American film industry, with their soundtracks offering music in every scene. So much has the influence been, we now “expect life to come with background music” (Frith 2002, 36).  So is our passive listening in daily life similar to that of a movie soundtrack? A movie soundtrack is designed so that it supports and reinforces the narrative of the particular scene[8] (Levitin 2006, 9).  Whilst I am standing in an elevator, I am listening to Muzak. I would argue that the creators of Muzak, or the owners or managers of the particular location where the elevator is found, design the Muzak – the soundtrack – to support and reinforce the experience of me being in that elevator. I, along with other shoppers step into that elevator. The doors close and we ride the elevator up to our chosen floor, whilst either actively or passively listening to the Muzak. The doors open, I step out of the elevator and leave the particular scene and that particular sound track. I step out into a department store, into another scene, with another soundtrack being piped through the sound system. Again (according to the owners or managers of the particular department store) that soundtrack is there to support and reinforce my experience of being in that store.  One issue with this analogy could be the speed that we now move in life, from one scene, to another scene, to another scene. In daily life, with people moving so quickly from one environment (scene) to another, to another, the passive listener may be subjected to innumerable unrelated pieces of music with differing moods and messages over a relatively short period of time[9](Frith 2002, 37). I would argue that this is where a movie seems to have a much more congruent flow within it, from one scene to another scene, to another.  In my daily life, moving from one scene to another with such speed as I do, and experiencing such diversity of soundtracks, I often find the soundtrack becomes overwhelming – often cacophonic – , and greatly diminishes – rather than supports and reinforces – my experience of that environment.

1.2.2 Musicking – consuming music (listening) everyday

Irrespective of ones’ opinions towards the morality such prevalence of passive listening occurs in public places in modern society, individuals in western cultures now have increased understanding regarding the impact of music can have both psychologically and physiologically, and now are increasingly choosing to use music to manipulate their own behaviour (Sloboda 2005,320).  “We as active consumers use music to direct and reflect the tempo of our daily lives” (Pen 1992, 3). It is interesting to note how quickly this cultural phenomenon has progressed. In citing a 1997 conversation with a person of Nigerian decent, Denora highlights how a Western person was likely to listen to music relative to an African person:

”As he saw it, Europeans merely listened to music, whereas in Africa people made music as an integral element of social life”.  This person was of the opinion, that “people in the United Kingdom ….. did not seem to be aware of music’s powers, and did not respect its social and physiological force” (DeNora, 2004 ix).

For many decades, westerners have been increasingly made aware of how certain cultural groups used music. Christians – irrespective of denomination – have historically used music in their religious ceremonies. In a contrasting musical style, American Indians also use music during spiritual ceremonies. As do continental Indians; and for that matter, as do most cultural around the globe use music in their religious ceremonies.  But, what about in their everyday life?  The example that comes to mind is the Africans singing blues songs whilst labouring as slaves in the fields and on the chain gangs in southern USA in the early nineteenth century. For what became the musical styles of gospel, soul, blues, and rhythm and blues, this form of music and song was not just created in southern USA on the back of their enslavement and impoverished conditions. This form of music and song had its origins in their African culture. Such music and song was an integrated part of them engaging in their daily activities: using music to their advantage and manipulate their own moods and behavior.

Interestingly, in just a few years from Denora’s conversation taking place, Batt-Rawden and Denora (2005) studied and revealed signs of development of such social and cultural norms amongst Westerners. Their study found people who were consciously and deliberately using music for specific ends. Their subjects shared how they played and listened to music to manipulate their own moods, or the moods of others within their social setting – consciously and deliberately. Some examples of subjects using music are: for emotional work – “recalibrating self and energy levels to perform a task one might not otherwise feel ‘in the mood for’ “ (p290); for motivation – “getting into their bodies” for physical exercise (p291); establishing an ambience for a social event (p290); and for transformational learning (p297). Slobada’s 2005 Pilot study involving 85 music listeners revealed six (6) factors that people consciously used music for. These were: to induce energy; achieve a state of transcendence; to reminisce; to be analytical; unpredictability (of the music playlist); and change emotional states (Sloboda 2005, 321). A later study revealed twenty-nine (29) uses of music for either social, psychological or physiological desired outcomes (Sloboda 2005, 324-5). All of these studies’ examples exemplify how contemporary musical agency has developed from what they refer to as the ”mundane musicking” of past eras (Batt-Rawden and Denora 2005, 292). As contemporary musical agents, we are now more likely to use music to manipulate our own behaviours – or those in our social settings – consciously, deliberately and systematically. Proactive musicking is seen to enhance the quality of our daily lives. Referencing Denora, Frith notes “(a)s a technology of self’, music has become crucial to the ways people organise memory, identity, their autonomy” (Frith 2002, 43). Taylor explains that we now “use music to regulate our moods and behaviours, and to produce a desirable image of ourselves, both for ourselves, and for others” (Taylor 2012, 43). In the previous section – electroacoustic and sonic art-based approach to music-making practice – I introduced the example of proactive musicking within alternative health sector practices using soundscapes – new age relaxation soundscapes – to establish a mood aligning the business and the consumers expectation; that of a peaceful and calm ambience conducive to health and wellness.

1.2.3 Musicking – broadening the understanding of the music and sound-making process

As noted above, music relies on a particular sense to receive it – that of listening.  A predominantly aural experience, but depending upon the situation, may draw on other senses [10]. Rickard and Chin subscribes to Elliot’s definition of music as being a:

“multidimensional human phenomenon involving two interlocking forms of intentional human activity: music making and music listening.” (Rickard & Chin 2017, 291;Elliot 1995,42). 

According to Elliot, one phenomenon can not happen without the other: music and sound-making and music listening are inextricably linked. Elliot uses the descriptive word intentional in his definition. I assume intentionality resides in the party who is playing that music – the music-maker; whilst also residing within the party who is actively – intentionally – listening to that music?  I am unsure of how Elliot’s definition relates to passive music consumption – listening – situations that most of us found us in on a daily basis. I wonder what Elliot’s view is of a passive listener in an elevator who is engaged in conversation with the person next to them, and does not stop to notice the music? I would assume from Elliot’s definition this does not qualify as intentional listening, and therefore the Muzak being played in not music? To take this further, consider a similar situation in an elevator, where a person disengages from the conversation with the person next to them, stops for a moment and notices the piece of music playing? Does this now count as music as there is both music-making occurring and active – intentional – music listening?

Small’s 1998 work “Musicking” embraces a broader view of music-making, and the consumption of music. With the rapidly developing patterns of music consumption the western world was experiencing, Small’s work examined the world of the performing music-maker in order to better understand the dynamics at play. Small acknowledged that music-making was not merely a transmissional communication process occurring from person A (music-maker) to person B (audience member/consumer/listener).  Small’s view is both parties are considered necessary for the music-making process to exist. The music-maker as the creator – the sender of communication – with the audience member/s being the receiver of the communication. The audience member interprets the communication, and responds in any variety of ways, including sending another message. The music-maker receives the communication feedback, interprets their response, takes action and returns follow up communication. The process continues for as long as the performance exists. The significance of Small’s work is that no longer is the process of communication and meaning-making seen to reside exclusively within the domain of the music-maker (creator/performer).  Small’s work is based on the premise that “(t)here was no such thing as music. Music is not a thing at all but an activity, something that people do”[11](Small 1998, 2). Hargreaves et al support this view with:

(m)usic is a fundamental channel of communication: it provides a means by which people can share emotions, intentions and meanings even though their spoken language may be incomprehensible” (2002, 1)

Building upon Small’s dual roles of meaning-making in the music-making process, Taylor’s extends this theme defining music as to what it affords us as humans – collaborative transactional communication for meaning-making, of both the music and of our selves:

“Music is a way for us to translate, perform, and intensify through our bodies, intimate thoughts, feelings and desires of the body. The act of creating and performing music – whether creating it or performing it ourselves or listening to it, and thus performing musical meaning-making operations for ourselves (Frith, 1996) – results not only in the creation and performance of sounds but also in the creation and performance of subjectivities” (Taylor 2012, 43).

Returning to Elliot’s definition for a moment, I wonder how the use of the word intentionality fits within Small’s model of musicking? In Small’s model, the process of music-making and listening are seen as an active dual role process – sender and receiver; music-maker and listener meaning-maker. I wonder whether Elliot had a participatory, collaborative and interdependent view of the communication process during music-making in mind; or more of a transmissional view of the creator/performer and audience member roles in the music-making process?

1.2.4 Self-making and meaning-making in music-making practice

Ryan considers creative practice to be not limited to an expressive extension of the self, but essential practice for creative arts practitioner to look deeper into the self:

“Self-awareness and identity are significant both in the study of the arts and in becoming an artist, as aesthetic inquiry and performance are constituted by subjective self-expression in relation to objective conditions” (Ryan 2014,77).

Velosa and Carvalho’s (2013) “Music Composition as a way of learning: emotions and the situated ‘self’ “ and Taylor’s (2008) “Pink Noise: Queer Identity and Musical Performance in a local context” both stress the importance of situating the self within the context of the creative practice interest, in order to study it. As do Taylor’s (2012) and Peraino’s (2006) studies of gender.  Webber (2009) clearly reinforces these perspectives in “In music and in life: confronting the self through auto-ethnography” with his claim that it is necessary to situate the self within practice – in order to be very familiar with that practice – in order to properly understand and analyse that practice:

…. “without that familiarity, there is no validity at all. One cannot “situate” without intimate self-knowledge. One cannot analyse ethnographic material, auto or not, if the “subject” is unfamiliar or unconnected with their own experience. Ethnography of any name is about situating the individual experience within culture” (Webber 2009, 268).

However, any activity in self-making is intrinsically tied to that of meaning-making. To understand our self in situations is to make meaning out of the situations as they present themselves. Meaning-making is central to our existence as humans in order to survive. In the current era, as technological change is occurring with increasing speed, there is an increased need to embrace change. One’s ability to embrace change is directly dependent upon one’s ability to derive meaning from the situation at hand.

“Rapid social change and technological change have become so commonplace… Developments that yesterday were in the realm of science fiction are now taken for granted. Throughout this bewildering maelstrom, however one thing has remained more or less constant: the limitations of people’s ability to cope with change” (Candy 1991, xiii).

Our ability to make meaning out of these situations will provide opportunities that are presented before us.  Kemp’s 1996 text “The Musical Temperament” poses his search for meaning which is not dissimilar of the problem posed for this research study: why does one individual engage in one particular musical style, or piece of music; but not another? (1996, 22). What is it that attracts us to particular styles of music? What is it about a roots-based approach to music-making practice – folk-rock, country-rock, country-folk, rock ‘n soul music and sound styles – that seems to have continually attracted my attention across so many decades? I venture out and listen to many other forms of music and sound styles, but I always seem to return back to these particular music and sound styles. Further, why I am drawn to a particular form of music-making, that based around one type of instrument, over others? Why have I always gravitated to the guitar – electric and acoustic – and not voice, a piano or keyboard, a wind instrument, or brass?  I love listening to music with a broad range of instruments, including that focussed on a piano or brass instruments. I had access to a keyboard from a young age, with an upright piano being placed in my bedroom at the age of nine (9)[12]. Yet, I have played guitar consistently for over three (3) decades, more than any other instrument I have engaged with. Even though my playing has decreased significantly during this study phase, hand exercisers still are always accessible for when I have a spare moment to keep my fingers moving[13].  The guitar is still the instrument that my hands want to reach for when I have a spare moment. I am confident if you asked any of my family, friends or colleagues as to what type of music-maker I am, they would surely respond ‘a guitarist’.

1.2.5 Connection of self to music

In his 2012 text “Song Means: Analysing and Interpreting Recorded Popular Songs” Moore discusses the notion that music is inexorably linked to all people; music is tied to the development of ones’ self-image and self-concept; and as result music offers value to each of us, individually. Moore suggests that each person derives a particular meaning from a particular piece of music, that is likely to differ to a meaning that another person derives:

“Who are you? How do you define yourself, your identity? The chances are that who you believe yourself to be is partly founded on the music you use, what you listen to, what value it has for you, what meanings you find in it” (Moore 2012, 1)

Moore’s notion is that music is inexorably linked to all people; music is tied to the development of ones’ self-image and self-concept; and as result music offers value to each of us, individually. In their article “What are Musical Identities, and why are they important” Hargreaves et al develop Moore’s somewhat simplistic view of identity, offering two (2) perspectives of identity that  are relevant for music-making: 1) “Identities in Music (IIM)”; and 2) “Music in Identities (MII)”. Firstly,  “Identities in music” refer to “social categories and cultural music practices” (2002, 14). In the previous section I referred to my self as guitarist. This is an example of a social category of music-making practice. The music and sound styles I mentioned are examples of cultural music-making practices. Secondly, “Music in identities” refer to “how we use music as a means of, or as a resource for, developing other aspects of our personal identities, including gender identity; youth identity; national identity; and disability and identity” (2002, 15). With this explanation  it is now clearer as to what Moore was referring to in his notion, that of the second perspective: “Music in Identities”.  Thus far in this document, I have spent a portion on the first perspective: “Identities in Music”.  I would therefore suggest that any discussion of contemporary music-making requires an equitable discussion of both perspectives. It will be my focus to present such a balanced view by the conclusion of this review document.

Further reading of existing literature reveals an imbalance: “research on musical identity has focused so heavily on one form of activity (music-making), overlooking how an individual’s musical identity might also be shaped by their participation in music reception (music listening)..” (Rickard & Chin 2017, 291).  Rickard & Chin list studies that have engaged in the reception of music to some degree, but suggest any future studies should differentiate between the type of listening – active and passive; as well as looking more closely at the identities and profiles of the participants in the music-making process, including their experiences in music and music-making (2017, 291). Moore supports this view by referencing other academics who acknowledge the significance of one’s prior experience in music-making to inform one’s ability and competency in listening. He provides an explanation of a trumpet playing music-maker having a greater neurological response to trumpet-based music, than for example, piano-based music (Moore 2012, 4). As a guitarist I would agree I have a greater cognitive response to guitar-based music as I can understand what the guitarist is playing, and therefore appreciate the skill and dexterity of the player or the arrangement of that piece of music. However, Moore’s provided example does not explain my particular situation where, I – a guitarist – am drawn to certain pieces of music that are piano-based. I do not have routine expertise with the piano, an instrument I have attempted numerous times to formally study. Rather than having a cognitive response to the piano, I interpret I have more[14] of an affective response to the piano. Sonically, I love the breadth of the spectral range of the piano’s keyboard. Relative to the guitar, it is far wider. I love the timbre of a beautifully tuned and richly resonant acoustic piano, across a full keyboard. Relative to an acoustic guitar, the timbre is more consistent across the entire instrument. I love the fact that a piano can sound based on the degree of attack and/or pressure the music-maker places on each key. I love the way a piano can sustain a note, and via the large acoustic body, that note can hang, and then drift away for what seems a lifetime. I love how a adequately competent piano music-maker is able to have two hands playing accompaniment simultaneously, with that of rhythm, harmony and melody. So whilst my experience with a piano is not that of a competent instrumentalist, I interpret I would most definitely have a significant physiological response – namely, affective – to piano-based music. Perhaps, such a response is due to the fact that I don’t consider this to be a major instrument for me. Perhaps such a response is due to the fact that I have attempted to play this instrument at certain times in my life, and I haven’t been able to achieve a level that I am satisfied with. Perhaps such a response is due to the fact that despite not having achieved a level with that instrument that I am satisfied with. I do play other instruments to a competent level, and therefore possibly I hold the piano at a level of respect beyond that which I hold other instruments to? These musings may go in part to explain my natural gravitation to piano-based music. I think it is important at this point to note Moore’s use of the term neurological, relative to my preferred use of the terms cognitive and affective. I use the term cognitive, in order to differentiate between what I consider the basis of my musical knowledge – my ability to analyse technically what the musician I was listening to was playing; and what the arrangement of the song – musically and sonically  – was. I use the term affective to differentiate my listening to the aesthetics of the musical piece; a place where I often lose my self in the moment of the musical piece; a place where I am not necessarily listening to the technical aspects of the piece of music.

However, it is the point of Moore’s discussion that I feel I am most troubled about: whether I as a not-competent piano player would experience less neurological response to piano-based music, than a competent piano player would? I am not a scientist or an expert in neurology.  However, I am aware of numerous studies that have resulted in showing a link between listening to music, and neurologically stimulating the brain in regions that are typically activated by other “pleasurable stimuli” (Rickard & Chin 2017, 291; Menon & Levitin, 2005, 175; Clynes 1982; Chanda & Levitin 2013, 179; Levitin 2006; Koelsch & Siebel 2005, 578; Janata & Grafton 2003, 682; Brattico et al 2013[15]; Zatorre & Salimpoor 2013, 10430). Menon & Levitin’s 2005 article – from what I understand as a non-scientist –  reports that following the stimulus of listening to music, a physiological response – both cognitive and affective responses – were noted. As a non-scientist, the examples of my listening experiences I provided above would provide auto-ethnographic data that is consistent with Menon & Levitin’s finding. However, in contrast, I am unsure of what Moore’s point was in tabling his reference regarding a neurological response[16]. I interpret the studies confirm, that in listening to pleasurable music, there is a response neurologically that something pleasurable just happened. Unfortunately, Moore is inferring that such a neurological response as being proof that a person with experience will – by default – derive greater meaning and understanding as a listener.

1.2.6 Motives and values

Given I have established parameters of identity, another central aspect of the phenomenon of music is that of motivation and values.  At a base level of motives lie human needs. In Kemp’s exploration of music-making practitioners and their temperaments, he offered Cattrel and Child’s 1975 research findings of personal characteristics in relation to education and learning achievements.  It was found that motive – along with equal parts of ability and personality – had a positive impact on one’s achievements (Kemp 1996, 24). Tabling a developed version of Maslow’s Hierarchy of human needs listing the seven (7) needs of humans:

“physiological needs (food, water, activity, rest, sex), safety needs (security, protection, shelter), love and belongingness needs (receiving and giving love and affection), esteem needs (respect from others and self-esteem), cognitive needs (curiosity, exploration, search for meaning, and knowledge), aesthetic needs (for beauty, order, symmetry), and finally, self-actualisation (realising one’s true potential)” (Kemp 1996, 27).

Maslow proposed that all humans work through each of the needs across their life.

“In terms of motivation, Maslow argued that each step of the hierarchy must be satisfied before the next can be activated, and that once a need was satisfied it no longer is a motivated behaviour. Moreover, Maslow believed that self –actualisation – that is, achieving one’s full potential – was the summit of human being’s existence” (Robbins 2009, 51).

Questions that come to mind are:

• What human needs motivate music-makers/creators in their music-making/creating practice?
• What human needs motivate music-makers/listeners in their music-making/listening practice?

Is it: their need for love and belonging (receiving and giving love and affection), and making music assists practitioners in achieving this?; or, is it for esteem needs (respect from others and self-esteem), and making music assists practitioners in achieving this?; is it for cognitive needs (curiosity, exploration, search for meaning, and knowledge)?; or, is it for aesthetic needs (for beauty, order, symmetry)? Whilst Kemp did not provide results from sampled data, he offered that music-making practitioners should be motivated by the human need of self-actualisation “(t)hrough aesthetic experiences of the kind offered by music”. This should not be surprising, given Kemp is clearly assuming a humanistic psychology perspective of the likes of Rogers and Maslow – as per his use of Maslow’s Hierarchy of human needs[17]. Kemp concludes by offering his inclination, that music-making practitioners are involved in music-making as a way to meet the dual needs of personal development and identity development: “a driving force may relate to a deep-seated need to develop their self-esteem and personal identity” (Kemp 1996, 33). Cross and Tolbert – over a decade later – agree with his view:

“perhaps the primary motivation for engaging with music in the contemporary Western world is to facilitate the transactions involved in formulating, presenting and affirming the multiple dimensions of individual and group identities” (2009, 31). 

Clayton looks more specifically to the medium of music for motive citing Merriam’s ten principal functions of music. Clayton implies these functions of music would be motivators music-making practitioners may have in explaining why they are engaging in music-making: “Emotional expression; aesthetic enjoyment; entertainment; communication; symbolic representation; physical response; enforcing conformity to social norms; validation of social institutions and religious rituals; contribution to the continuity and stability of culture; and contribution to the integration of society” (Clayton 2009, 35). These functions are broad, but I am comforted they are narrower as compared to Kemp’s use of Maslow’s Hierarchy of human needs. However the question arises: Firstly, I wonder what the percentage of music-making practitioners is who consciously engage in music-making practice for these reasons? Secondly, assuming we get some positive responses from music-making practitioners re my first question, I wonder whether the results would vary based on what musical style the music-making practitioner is engaged in? Whilst I think this is an interesting – and potentially relevant – investigation, I will leave such an exploration at this time.

The second term related to motive is that of values. Quite simply, values are defined as: “global beliefs that ‘transcendentally guide actions and judgments across specific objects and situations’ ” (Rokeach in Rokeach, 1979, 72).  However Hofstede cautions: (t)he term “value” or “values” is used in all social sciences (anthropology, economics, political science, psychology, and sociology) with different though not completely unrelated meanings” (Hofstede 1984, 18). More specifically, Rokeach paraphrases sociologist Williams:

“values are core conceptions of the desirable within every individual and society. They serve as standards or criteria to guide not only action but also judgement, choice, attitude, evaluation, argument, exhortation, rationalisation, and ….. attribution of causality” (1979, 1).

Rockeach offers all values have “cognitive, affective and directional aspects” (1979, 15) and as such, not all values share an equal weighting to an individual or society. Defining two (2) distinct groups of values, Rokeach outlines “terminal or ends values and instrumental or means values”. Terminal values are those one desires over one’s lifetime in terms of existence and purpose. In contrast, instrumental values differentiate are those that are seen to be “instrumental to the attainment desirable end states (such as behaving honestly or responsibly”. “Value hierarchies or priorities are organisations of values enabling us to choose between alternative goals and actions, and enabling us to resolve conflict. ……” These assist us to “guide decisions about such things as the setting of … goals, (and) the allocation of resources”.. (1979, 47). Focussing, Hofstede suggests values share the characteristics of “the desired” and the desirable”. By desired, Hofstede explains the value is individual-centric, “intense” and “important” for that individual to gauge their success. By desirable, Hofstede explains the value is socially or culturally-centric, providing “direction” for the community as a collective, and a “good, right” quality that the individual “ought, should” be guiding their life by (Hofstede 1984, 20). Values are central to empowering individuals to make appropriate decisions during practice, in order to realise a desired end goal. With out the value guiding this process, it is highly possible that the practitioner discriminates between options in a very systematic manner, potentially at the risk of losing creativity. Corporations focussed on creating sustainable business understand the importance of having a strong culture disseminated within every level of the organisation in order to have all parties within the entity maintain focus on the desired end goal, but discriminating based on the particular situation and elements presented before them in that unique situation. Thus the practitioner can maintain a degree of creative application with in the discrimination process – the decision-making process – but still maintain alignment to the desired end goal (Robbins et al, 2009, 189-190).

Graham starts by asking a generic question of music: “What is important about it, and what can we hope to get from it?” (Graham 1995, 139).  Hesmondhalgh offers the importance of music at a macro level of society and culture, and how music can influence the questioning of, and development of social and cultural values:

“Music, especially when combined with other forms of communication – and it nearly is always combined with other forms of communication – can be very powerful forging, fostering, solidifying, and challenging values and attachments” (2013, 146).

Green offers a contrasting perspective, focussing on the value of music from a micro level:

“Individual temporal music experience arises directly from musical materials that inhere in music and create meanings between themselves, for consciousness, through time. Both the materials that create meanings, and the materials that are being meant, ultimately indistinguishable one from the other as a hierarchy of processes and forms, have existence”. These are “the parameters of music”, with its “inherent musical meaning”(Green 1988, 25).  

Graham focuses on the value of music from the perspective of the music-maker/creator, in the context of composition. Graham argues, for music to be effective it must represent an idea in the minds of the listener of that music. Graham is very clear with the word represents – not to mean to imitate, but more so to prompt an idea – an object or feelings – within the mind of the listener (Graham 1995, 145-6).  This may only be a momentary experience, as music exists in time, rising, and then vanishes as quickly. Hegel confirms: “(m)usic does not have an objective and external existence” such as other material objects – most notably fine art and sculpture. (Green 1988, 14). This is the mystique of music. Good music tempts us with expectation before it arrives; rises, affording us an aesthetic experience; and then immediately vanishes in time, leaving us only the residual feelings and memory of that aesthetic experience (Brattico et al 2013, 2).  It is interesting to consider the music-maker/composer, composes with the intent of prompting an idea – at a future point in time – in someone who they are most likely have not yet met, at the time of the composition[18]. In wrestling with the meaning of music, Budd differentiates aural forms of arts – such as music – from other art forms such as visual arts. In contrast to painting which can effectively represent the world, the humanist theory of music maintains  “music is essentially a form of abstract, and not representational, art… (M)usic’s non-representational and non-propositional nature” affords humans the opportunity to connect with “presented phenomena that are integral to human life” beyond the literal (Budd 1992, 52). In music, humans “recognise moods, feelings, emotions, attitudes and various other states and activities of our inner life manifested in such a way that, if we are sensitive to their presence … we value these musical works because of their essential human reference” (Budd 1992, 52). It is these affective qualities – the non-literal –, which allow humans to connect to different forms of music and sound-making practice.

Cross proposes: “it is undoubtedly the case that music is valued for its affective powers in all societies, music’s meanings extend beyond its affective value”; (2009, 7) “the significance and distinctness of music” is also as a ”cognitive process and as social behaviour” Though, Cross concludes, “(m)uch of what we know or infer is based on very sketchy evidence, and there is immense scope for empirical exploration” (2009, 11).  In Reimer et al’s 2002 study, they attempted to answer the question: “(c)an the value of music be identified as one particular contribution it makes to people’s lives? (Reimer et al 2002, 41). They found five (5) global values that may in some part explain why humans gravitate to music. Firstly, music allows humans to fulfil their need. “To be human is to make meaning and seek meaning”. In engaging with music, humans make meanings out of situations (2002, 44); secondly, music is a holistic cognitive, embodied and affective experience, encompassing “mind, body and feeling” (2002, 46); thirdly, music is valued as a “universal, cultural, and individual” phenomenon, something that all humans can experience irrespective of their nationality or culture (2002, 48); fourthly, music is both a “product and a process”, with both being considered necessary for musical experience to exist (2002, 50); fifthly, music is “pleasurable and profound”, allowing humans to connect to emotion for significant experience” (Reimer et al 2002, 52). I note the consistency of these findings with the views presented above by Hesmondhalgh, Green, Graham, Battico and Cross. I also note the synergy between the value of music with the defining of musicking as a two way dynamic transactional communication process, as per Small’s and Taylor’s views.

Returning to Kemp’s quote: why does one individual engage in one particular musical style, or piece of music; but not another? (1996, 22). What is it that attracts us to particular styles of music? In terms of the amount of research into music-making, aligned with Cross’s view, Hesmondhalgh’s observation in his 2013 “Why Music Matters”: there is “a remarkable lack of material that simply considers why people value the music they like” (2013, 136). It would seem that in the period from Kemp’s 1996 comment to 2013 there was only marginal development of data in this area. As the foundation of my research study, I will continue to explore what research has been conducted, and to discover what new knowledge has been developed that provides insight into the phenomenon I have outlined.  Thus far, I have found gaps in existing knowledge that I need to explain my particular creative practice experience relative to the three (3) tenets of: music-making, meaning-making and self-making.

1.2.7 Experience – meaning-making, self-making, and music and sound-making practice

As established, humans need to understand their experience. Mezirow proclaims:

“our urgent need to understand and order the meaning of our experience, to integrate it with what we know to avoid the threat of chaos” (2012, 73). 

The act of meaning-making is interpreting the unique situation that presents itself. The interpretation of the unique experience affords one a range of potential actions to take, at that moment in time.

“Only when things about us have meaning for us, only when they signify consequences that can be reached by using them in certain ways, is any such thing as intentional, deliberate control of them possible” (Dewey in Mezirow 1991, 11).

The act of meaning-making – one’s interpretation of the unique experience – is therefore intrinsically tied to acquiring knowledge: experiencing a unique situation; attempting to make meaning out of the unique situation, by interpreting the situation to understand the situation; and discriminating between options in order to take next step action. Developing new knowledge – that is, learning – draws on one’s previously held – existing knowledge, based on past experiences and interpretive understandings of those unique situations. As already established in a previous section, experience and deriving – interpreting – a meaning out of that experience – that is, learning – is not limited to just a cognitive process.

“Learning means using a meaning that we have already made to guide the way we think, act, or feel about what we are currently experiencing. Learning … involves making a new experience explicit and schematizing, appropriating, and acting upon it” (Mezirow 1991, 11).

It is an embodied experience, drawing on biological, psychological and cognitive faculties and capacities; and affect. As such, experience is a subjective experience. What influences and motivates one person, will not necessarily affect another person in the same way (Fredrickson 2000, 594). Memory is an integral element of one’s discrimination process. Memory influences one’s discrimination of future experiences as new situations arise:

“People’s past and ongoing experiences guide their decisions about the future. These affective experiences include emotions, moods and other subjective states like pleasure and pain, liking and disliking, hope and dread” (Fredrickson 2000, 577).

It is within these memories that we gain insight into what we have previously made meaning – how we have previously interpreted – a previous experience. The memories of these past experiences accumulate to become, our knowledge. However Kensinger and Schacter found memories with an associated affect are more likely to be remembered, than memories without a significant associated affect (2010, 602). Therefore our accumulated knowledge is influenced by those memories prioritised as having a significant associated affect, over those without significant associated affect. In this way, “(p)ast experience provides boundary conditions for integrating and differentiating information and for determining the meaning of an event” (Mezirow 1991,10).  All memories exist within our short-term, sensory or long-term memory (Merriam et al 2007, 393-394). However, memories associated with affect are more readily accessible, than others. In Fredrickson’s (2000) article “Extracting meaning from past affective experiences: The importance of peaks, ends, and specific emotions” it is argued memories are recalled based on the “duration of the affective episode. (P)ast affective episodes can be well predicted by the affect experience during just two moments: the moment of the peak affect intensity and the ending. Peoples past and ongoing affective experiences guide their decisions about the future” (Fredrickson 2000 577). Understanding one’s memories affords the practitioner an opportunity to reflect on their past discriminations, assess them, and as a result, consider what they could potentially do in in the event a similar situation arises to experience. As all knowledge is context specific – relevant to a particular context and point in time – revisiting past experiences – memories – offers a benefit to a practitioner. In engaging in reflective practice of past experience, the practitioner continues to learn and develop himself or herself; and their practice. Jarvis encourages this perspective: it is “in the memories of previous experiences, that I interact with myself and learn and grow” (Jarvis 2012, 16).  Goncalves and Riberio are more assertive: the development of self “is regulated by processes of construction and reconstruction of meanings which occur in the context of narrating oneself to others” (2012, 301). Humans are complex beings who are afforded the ability to revisit past experiences – memories – using their combined rational and extra-rational faculties. Our ability to reflect is essential for self-referential activity.  The memory process – including remembering a distant memory – is a complex process. “Remembering involves the recreation of past events”. These “may be reproductive, constructive, or reconstructive and can involve a copy of an experience, the construct of the meaning of a new experience, or the reconstrual of a meaning previously assigned to an experience” (Mezirow 1991, 10).  In the event, that an interpretation is not comfortable within their faculties, humans may choose to reinterpret that memory as something other than it was first remembered to be.  Such is the capacity of a human. Mezirow cautions:

“If we are unable to understand, we often turn to tradition, … or … create imaginary meanings” (2012, 73). 

As humans we are either developing, or not. Engaging in experience and developing an understanding of what one has experienced, generates new knowledge. In contrast, engaging in experience without developing an understanding of what one has experienced, does not generate new knowledge. Mezirow concludes: “(a)s adult learners, we are caught in our own histories” (1991, 1). Relying on traditional ways of approaching a situation prohibits one from developing adaptive skills. Adaptive expertise and competence is the “ability to apply meaningfully learned knowledge and skills flexibly and creatively in different situations”. Adaptive expertise contrasts to “routine expertise”, where a task can be completed effectively and efficiently, “but without understanding” (de Corte 2010, 45). One needs to consciously, deliberately and systematically employ strategies to examine past experiences, reinterpret the meaning, to generate new knowledge. It is in the process of generating new knowledge that one develops adaptability. de Corte (2007; de Corte et al 2004) found: “(b)uilding adaptive competence.. requires .. cognitive, affective and motivational components”. Specifically:

1. 1. “A well-organised and flexibly accessible domain-specific knowledge base”;
   2. “Heuristic methods” of “strategies for problem analysis and transformation”;
   3. “Meta knowledge” accepting “ones’ cognitive potential can be developed through learning and effort”;
   4. “Self-regulatory skills” to be reflective and reflexive;
   5. “Positive beliefs about oneself as a learner in general and in a particular subject” (de Corte 2010, 46)

Such adaptive competence shares qualities of a fully functioning as proposed by Rogers. A fully-functioning person is reported as having the traits of someone with “great acceptance of self” and “great creativity” (Ewen 2003, 225-227). According to Hermans & Kempen, creativity and its sub-set, “imagination is nothing but extended or compounded memory” (1993, 1177). Reflective practice of past experiences affords the development of new knowledge, guiding the development of a positive self-system. A person with adaptive competence therefore is one on a positive upward spiral in life, developing their creativity, imagination, knowledge, and resilience; affording them greater curiosity, and willingness for trial and error experimentation in practice. Experimental music-making practitioners such as Cage and Zappa chose to engage in music and sound styles demanding demonstration of innovation, experimentation and imagination[19] (Schwartz et al 1998, 334; Cotter 2002, 593). High Art music-making practitioners conform to strict traditions (Pen 1992, 11).  It would be interesting to investigate a sample of music-making practitioners to determine their motives, values, beliefs and attitudes towards self-referential activity. I would be interested to survey their understanding of, and approach to, developing new knowledge. At this point in my research study, I am curious how contemporary music-making practitioners evaluate their engagement in the development of new knowledge? As indicated, Ryan holds examining the self is essential practice for a creative arts practitioner. I am curious as to the degree contemporary music-making practitioners pursue self-referential activity. If so, how? If not, why not? Is it because they do not choose to engage in critical – conscious, deliberate and systematic – reflective and reflexive practice of past experiences? It would be interesting to investigate in a future research study whether there is a causal relationship between a traditional orientated music-making practitioners’ perception of self; their engagement in self-referential activity such as conscious, deliberate and systematic reflective practice; and the level of development of their adaptive competence.  Self-reflection is defined as “a temporary phenomenological experience in which self becomes an object to oneself” (Gillespie 2007, 678). In self-reflection, one is looking at oneself through ones’ own eyes; through ones own worldview; with ones bias of culture, society and knowledge. One is looking at oneself subjectively. An inherent danger of this subjective reflection could be self-delusion as outlined previously (self-serving bias). However, as per the humanistic perspective, only one can truly look into oneself. Only one has access to one’s distant and perhaps lowly prioritised past experiences – memories. “The recollection of a past thought or action requires a full-blooded first-personal perspective…. A full-blooded first-personal perspective is not simply a point of view,…but .. an ‘agential orientation’ ”:  this “perspective is reflective, affective, evaluative, and agential”.  Rather than being simply memory, it is a first person narrative “recall” of past experiences (Atkins 2008, 80-81). These embodied narrative recollections afford the self an opportunity to revisit and re-examine past experiences with multiple faculties: biologically, psychologically, cognitively; and affect. It affords the re-examination and perhaps re-alignment of ones self-system – self-image, self-concept, self-esteem and self-identity. These embodied narrative recollections afford the re-examination of one’s self-culture – one’s values, beliefs and attitudes – with opportunity for reinterpretation. These embodied narrative recollections afford one the opportunity to re-formulate one’s self-narrative – the position of I in particular situations – with ones’ dialogical self (Neisser 1994, 15).

I have established first person narrative “recall” of past experiences – memories – requires conscious, deliberate and systematic reflection.  Contemporary creative practitioners benefit from engaging in such critical reflective and reflexive practice, developing their extra-rational faculties of creativity and imagination. A fully-functioning person interacts with their past experiences – their first personal narrative memories – assessing their past discriminations, to transform their knowledge (experience and understanding). This practice affords one reflexive opportunity, developing discrimination options, which may be implemented as similar situations arise in the future.

 Not all memories are positive, and comfortable for the subject to revisit. In her 2000 text “Memory, Narrative, Identity” King describes an extreme scenario: the memory of a holocaust victim and how horrific experiences influenced their self-narrative and identity; and how then the self directs their decision-making as new situations arise for the self to experience (2000, 119-149). For a person with a negative past experience of a situation not dissimilar to a new situation arising, it is likely to cause a negative rational and extra-rational faculties response (Wertsch 2007, 648; Changeux 2009, 40). That person is not likely to proactively engage in a similar yet new experience, to develop new knowledge. Therefore the human learning cycle will stop. Learning depends upon humans engaging in new experiences, reinterpreting old experiences, and reimagining alternate course of action to take. To avert the cessation of the learning cycle in the event of negative past experience, Wertsch outlines an effective way to mediate this situation from occurring as an ongoing event, is to reflect upon the past historical event. The disciplines of psychology and psychotherapy delve deep into human trauma (such as the example of the holocaust victim I provided earlier), and I am not advocating anything different here (Rowan 2012, 341-354).  However, not all negative trauma is of the extreme as per King’s example. As I have presented in a previous section, some negative rational and extra-rational faculties response – such as fear, anxiety, nervousness – is expected: the result of misalignment within the self-system whilst engaging in a new experience. During this learning experience, any negative rational and extra-rational faculties response will have an effect on one’s experience. Depending upon the person’s overall life experiential trajectory – a positive upward, or negative downward spiral – , a negative faculties response could be part of a systemic long-term negative pattern; or merely a one off transitory – fleeting- experience.

Lawrence advocates that arts practice offers an opportunity to reflect upon past experiences, re-examining and reinterpreting them; and reimagining alternate course of action to take (2012, 473). This process is not always conscious.

“Extrarational describes a process of meaning-making expressed through symbol image and emotional expression. These ways of knowing… call upon our imagination.. and our intuition.. come to us through dreams, mediations, and other unconscious processes – are often expressed through.. art forms” (Lawrence, 2012 472).

Engaging in memories, which generate negative affective responses, affords the opportunity to transform that past event from a negative memory, to that of a memory with a “usable past” (Wertsch 2007, 649-650). Lawrence argues discernment in creative practice – sifting through past experiences, drawing upon imagination and intuition – , can lead a practitioner to holistic insight and illumination of reinterpreted meanings (2012, 472).  Sagan concurs offering: “the temporal, spatial experience of making art affords minutely varying benefits in different domains at different times, and this repeated contact with the experience accumulates over time to produce transformation (DeNora in Sagan, 2015, 93).  Such a perspective acknowledges the transformational quality of artistic practice. Artistic and creative practice affords a return to preverbal forms of expression: curiosity, exploring, experimenting, creativity, and imagination. Kates in Lawrence identifies “creative expression as a return to imaginal play …. our most basic way of knowing” (2012, 473). Lawrence acknowledges  “(a)rt can both evocative (unintentional and spontaneous) or provocative (intentional and deliberate)”, with both approaches with potential to facilitate transformational learning (2012, 473). Whilst Mezirow advocates a similar holistic perspective, he draws heavily on the importance of cognition. In order to reconsider ones’ rational and extra-rational faculties responses, conscious, deliberate and systematic reflective & reflexive practice needs to be used to examine experiences – past or present:

“Transformative theory views memory as an inherent function of perception and cognition, an active process of recognizing again and reinterpreting a previously learned experience in a new context” (Mezirow 1991, 6).

Reflective practice involves assessing the examined past experience – the memory – relative to ones knowledge, values, beliefs and attitudes in the present.

“we reinterpret an old experience from a new set of expectations, thus giving a new meaning and perspective to the old experience. When we confront an aspect of an encounter that we do not understand, our expectations from prior learning serve as habits of selective perception that govern, first, how we delimit the experience and, second, how we select those elements of it that past experience tells us may be relevant to understanding. We have to sort through our past experience, that is, the alternative interpretations currently available to us, in order to assess what is relevant” (Meszirow 1991, 11-12).

As an integral part of the meaning-making process, humans seek validation of the meaning they are interpreting and deriving from a situation. Mezirow stresses the importance of knowledge validation in the learning process:

“We seek validation…., in the process of interpreting an experience, …. to question the truth, appropriateness, or authenticity of either a newly expressed or implied idea or one acquired through prior learning” (1991, 11).

Seeking validation is an embodied experience. The subject draws on multiple perspectives – external communication, or an internalised dialogue within the dialogical self, utilising their rational and extra-rational faculties. Engaging in creative practice affords a practitioner an opportunity to re-examine past experiences – memories – , reinterpret them within their current knowledge (accumulated experiences and understandings), and seek validation via response – external or internalised – to their emerging cultural production (Lawrence 2012, 478).

1.3 Summary

In Chapter 1 I introduced, discussed and analysed contemporary literature and textural resources across the three (3) interdependent tenets of self-making, meaning-making and creative practice.  In my initial project brief, my research study was to focus on developing a praxis I was to investigate and observe my practice, delineating the stages of practice, and the elements of practice across. In my initial investigations I highlighted five (5) stages of practice; and six (6) elements of praxis.  One of the elements highlighted early in the research study was self.  I therefore present an over view of self-making and meaning-making. I have found delving into the psychology of the self, complex. This should not have been surprising given the study subject – the human, and the mind – is still arguably largely not understood. Mere attempt to understand the self presents many challenges to discipline-trained researchers and theorists. As for my self – someone who despite extensive work in education & learning, management, communication, and creative arts practice – has no formal training and experience in the field of psychology. Whilst a fascinating field of investigation, I have little time to explore this subject matter more than I have done. For the purposes of my research study, I feel sufficiently informed. Discussion then developed to include subjectivity and agency in contemporary life, segueing into creative practice. Creative practice is deliberately broadly defined, to include that of: everyday music practice – musicking – ; and music and sound-making practice.  In doing so, I start to illuminate what seems to have become a highly fragmented and yet complex field of contemporary creative practice. As I progress into Project 2, I suspect I will need to continue to investigate the revolution of those engaging in music and sound-making practice; the result of ongoing exponential technological change, social and cultural developments, and the changing structure of formal hierarchical industry structure.

Footnotes:

[1] I am reflecting on how I have presented my self and choose to converse with different groups of people over the decades; for example, I present and converse with a group of trades people, a group of academics, and a group of aristocrats all quite differently – especially in my early adulthood.

[2] It must be noted that positive alignment does not equal perfect alignment between all three (3) elements of self.

[3] There are many great success stories around the world of people who failed many times before they finally succeeded.

[4] It is anecdotally that the field of creative arts in Australia attract a disproportionately higher number of practitioners with such disorders, than other fields and disciplines of study [relative to those in society].

[5] I understand Haseman’s comment to be: creative practitioner’s approach in a commercially-minded way – focussed and committed as Rogers (2013) was quoted as finding in Chapter 1. I do not interpret Haseman’s point 5 to be: millennia creative practice must be commercial practice.

[6] Muzak as a company has been in business since 1934 (Owen 2006, 70)

[7] Studies of a certain nationality of produce outsold another nationalities’ produce with particular music being played to passive listeners (Frith 2002, 43)

[8] …to the composer’s and/or Director’s liking

[9] Imagine a person in a large shopping complex, going in and out of numerous shops playing piped music over a sixty minute period, where each of the shops are aimed at diverse target markets and social sub-cultures.

[10] Depending upon the context, human expression and communication draws on a combination of human senses including (but not restricted to) that of: visual (sight), auditory (hearing), touch (somatosensation), smell (olfactory) or taste (gustatory). I will explore this further as the research study progresses.

[11] My italics

[12] In fact, if I am not mistaken, this piano arrived around the same time as the arrival of my first guitar.

[13]  My numerous hand exercisers always accompany me wherever I go – in my pocket, laptop bag, and car.

[14] I say ‘more of’, as I still believe I have enough understanding of music theory and the piano keyboard to understand the technical aspects of the piece of piano-based music I am listening to.

[15] Brattico et al’s 2013 article “Toward a neural chronometry for the aesthetic experience of music” is an article that I will also return to over the course of this Project 1 submission, as it provides new knowledge for my research study.

[16] The brain is still a largely unknown organism, and therefore unless every aspect of the recorded response could be explained, I would suggest that such an exercise may be limited in offering a concrete finding as Moore seems to infer. I am not a scientist, nor a neurologist, and only have very limited knowledge of certain aspects of the brain. I therefore feel it is inappropriate for me to offer greater comment than I have, at this time.

[17] Kemp (1996) does not offer extensive discussion of alternative views of psychology.

[18] As composition is to be a significant aspect of this chapter, I will return to this point at a later time.

[19] Experimental music and sound-making practitioners require these qualities

Please now refer to Pt28c – Research Study Project 1 Submission, for the continuation of this document which includes Chapter 2 Methodology.

NOTE:

• • all references are included in Pt28f – Research Study Project 1 Submission, and
  • a bibliography is included in Pt28g – Research Study Project 1 Submission.

– @David L Page 30/04/2018

– updated 30/08/2018

Copyright: No aspect of the content of this blog or blog site is to be reprinted or used within any practice without strict permission directly from David L Page.

Copyright: No aspect of the content of this blog or blog site is to be reprinted or used within any practice without strict permission directly from David L Page.